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Many working on practical reason are instrumentalists about 
practical reason. They hold that practical reasoning proceeds from 
desires immune to revision. Reasoning about action is taken to be 
means-end reasoning not revisable by other types of reasoning. 
So, according to the instrumentalist, all practical reasoning is 
reasoning which results in a practical judgment, an intention to 
act, or an action, and explains action by invoking desires and beliefs 
about how one may satisfy one's desires. Against this backdrop of 
the received wisdom regarding practical reasoning, Elijah Millgram 
proffers and ably defends an alternative to instrumentalism. 
Millgram calls his alternative practical induction. He argues 
that practical induction is a legitimate, indispensable form of 
inference—the practical analog of theoretical induction. Unlike 
instrumentalism, practical induction is not exclusionist. Millgram 
never claims that it is the only legitimate form practical reasoning 
takes. Means-end reasoning is only one form of practical reasoning; 
it has no legitimate claim to being the only kind of practical 
reasoning. 
Regarding the nature and importance of practical induction, 
Millgram writes that, "Like the more familiar forms of inductive 
reasoning , pract ical induction moves from ins tances to 
generalizations, and, also like them, it bottoms out in experience" 
(p. 6). In order to engage in practical reasoning we must be able to 
learn what to care about from experiences given that we often 
encounter new situations in which "the desires, aims, and interests 
we already have are too often suddenly obsolete" (p. 6). Practical 
inferences get their premises from the traditional sources often relied 
on in theoretical reasoning—experience/observation and testimony. 
Finally, by learning from new circumstances and employing 
practical induction we are able to preserve and project unified 
agency. 
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Millgram focuses on the case against instrumentalism in chapter 
2. He argues that we cannot simply desire at will. On the 
instrumentalist view, means-end reasoning fails "because it requires 
practical justification to bottom out in desires that themselves cannot 
involve further backward-directed commitments" (p. 39). Millgram 
adds that, "because desires figure in practical reasoning as bases 
for inference, they must involve backward-directed inferential 
commitments" (p. 39). Lest one think that hierarchical theories of 
motivation enable one to avoid this problem with instrumentalism, 
Millgram notes that second-order desires will not suffice as a 
substitute for such backward-directed inferences. This follows 
because, if we cannot desire at will, as Millgram contends, and 
one can only indirectly acquire desires when the appropriate 
conditions obtain, second-order desires "cannot account for the 
manageability of the desires we tum out to have" (p. 39). All the 
work that is done in managing our desires results from our 
backward-directed inferences. 
Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the contribution practical induction 
makes to the unity of agency and the indispensability of practical 
induction for the unity of agency, respectively. Chapter 5 explains 
why the argument of chapters 3 and 4 works. Chapter 6 treats the 
role of observation and the empirical nature of practical reasoning 
by focusing on the role of emotions, specifically, pleasure. In 
chapter 7 Millgram explores the function and indispensability of 
testimony, with a fascinating and stimulating treatment of the nature 
of friendship and the reliance on testimony in practical reasoning. 
Chapter 8 concludes the book by considering skepticism about the 
unity of agency. Millgram suggests that skepticism about diachronic 
unity of agency may be a live option while skepticism about 
synchronic unity of agency is less likely so. In the remainder of 
this review I will focus on the case offered in chapters 3-5 for 
practical induction. 
Millgram introduces practical induction as the analog of 
theoretical induction in the practical domain (p. 43). When one 
learns from one's experience that something is worth doing again, 
having generalized from particular experiences, the pattern of 
inference is an instance of practical induction. So, I may have had 
many pints of Guinness Stout in the past, my experiences of 
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consuming them having been enjoyable. Each pint was worth 
drinking. I conclude that Guinness Stout is worth drinking. My 
conclusion may guide my future or present actions. Millgram writes 
as follows about such reasoning. "A practical induction proceeds 
from practical judgments at a relatively lower level of generality 
to a practical judgment at a relatively higher level of generality 
that subsumes the more particular practical judgments as instances" 
(p. 45). 
But is practical induction really practical reasoning? In his 
seminal essay, "Practical Reasoning,"1 Gilbert Harman offered the 
minimality requirement on practical reasoning. The minimality 
requirement favors theoretical reasoning over practical reasoning 
in instances where a conclusion can be reached by theoretical 
reasoning alone. 2 One may argue that the results that allegedly 
obtain using practical induction are achieved by employing 
theoretical reasoning. That is, practical induction is reducible to 
theoretical reasoning. Consider the example of my judgment 
regarding Guinness Stout. It may be the case that, on the grounds 
of my previous experiences of imbibing Guinness at my local pub, 
I am predicting that I will enjoy drinking Guinness. In turn, I may 
employ what I have learned from my exper iences in an 
instrumentalist pattern of practical reasoning. So I may find myself 
with the sudden desire to drink a beer of a certain sort. I recall that 
I 've enjoyed Guinness Stout, and via a pattern of theoretical 
reasoning, predict that if I drink a pint of Guinness I will satisfy 
my desire for just such a beer. I conclude that I ought to get down 
to the pub and order a pint of Guinness. I had a desire for a certain 
type of beer, and, on the grounds of my previous experiences, predict 
that I will enjoy drinking a pint of Guinness Stout. The belief 
plays the role a belief normally would in an instrumentalist pattern 
of reasoning. But it was arrived at via theoretical reasoning that 
concluded with a prediction—predictions, it would seem, being 
the province of theoretical reasoning. Furthermore, the instrumental 
reasoning proceeded from a desire that matches the conclusion of 
my theoretical induction.3 
Harman's minimality requirement is restricting practical 
reasoning, I suspect to the extent that inductive reasoning is solely 
the domain of theoretical reason4—or perhaps all practical induction 
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is reducible to theoretical induction. Millgram agrees that 
sometimes such reconstructions that take what is going on to be 
specifically theoretical induction are correct. However, he suggests 
that one who reduces practical induction to theoretical induction 
assumes two burdens. First, she must produce "a purely theoretical 
inductive conclusion capable of interlocking with the posited 
desire" (p. 102). Second, she must produce "a desire capable of 
interlocking with the conclusion of the theoretical induction" (p. 
102). Such desires, Millgram argues, are not there to be had. He 
writes that, "the proposed factoring of practical induction into 
theoretical induction and instrumental reasoning requires the agent 
to have available desires whose objects match the conclusions of 
his theoretical inductions" (p. 103). Irreducible practical induction 
is needed because of the ways in which new domains of activity in 
which we must organize our plans, decisions, and actions open 
themselves up to us. Specifically, we cannot have desires general 
enough to cope with such new scenarios in which we employ 
practical reason. "So when a theoretical induction in a newly-
opened domain concludes, there will be no matching desire waiting 
to meet it" (p. 103). So, if the reductionist is correct, we are unable 
to form plans and initiate coherent patterns of agency in barely 
explored spheres of activity. But we can employ irreducible 
practical induction to get us a method that works, enabling us to 
deliberate, plan, and perform actions in new scenarios. Millgram 
writes that, "Our world is full of new and surprising things. The 
only way to come to understand how they matter for us is to let 
experience teach us. That is why we have to use practical induction" 
(p. 103). 
Whether or not this adequately addresses the reductionist 
argument, I am not certain. It seems that one who insists on reducing 
practical induction to theoretical induction may still have some 
means of defending her views. For one, going back to the role of 
theoretical reasoning in making predictions, one may argue, as 
Harman does, that it simply is not the role of practical reasoning to 
reach conclusions that are predictions. And it seems that at least 
some of the conclusions of putative practical inductions are 
predictions. Practical reasoning, on the other hand, should conclude 
with a practical judgment, an intention to act, or an action. But I 
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will not take this problem up further here. I will leave it to the 
reader to assess Millgram's argument and the arguments offered in 
defense of instrumentalism or against the sort of view defended by 
Millgram. There are no easy solutions to such problems; and 
Millgram does not pretend to have provided anything like an "easy" 
solution. 
The strongest selling point of Millgram's theory of practical 
induction is in its providing an account of unified agency. When 
one deliberates about how to act one is trying to address a practical 
question, viz., "What should I do?" (p. 49). Millgram writes that, 
"Now in the course of trying to answer this question, one may 
suppose that there is an / that could act on an answer to it. After 
all, if there were not, the question would have no practical point" 
(p. 49). One must assume in practical deliberation that one is an 
acting self—such an assumption being legitimized by the 
"dialectical context" of practical deliberation (p. 49). Thinking 
about what one should do only makes sense if there are things one 
is able to do. The concept of agency involves the notion of being 
able to exercise a certain type of power in a context of genuine 
options. And in the course of practical deliberation, one can assume 
that one is a unified agent, or at least unified enough for practical 
deliberation to have a point (p. 50). So practical induction, in 
Millgram's own words, is legitimate in the following sense: "its 
effectiveness is a precondition for unity of agency, from which it 
follows that, within the context of practical deliberation, it can be 
treated as a legitimate form of inference. That is, when you are 
trying to answer a practical question, you are within your rights 
using practical induction to do so" (p. 50). 
Millgram takes chapter 3 to sketch an account of the unity of 
agency—which he takes to consist in our ability to "square our 
conflicting concerns, interests, and priorities" (p. 50). How we do 
this depends on connecting judgments we obtain via practical 
induction. So Millgram sets himself to considering what intelligent 
choice looks like from the first-person perspective, thereby filling 
out the picture of the unity of agency from the inside out. This 
requires taking practical inferences to be defeasible—such 
defeasibility requiring that one bring to bear salient competing 
considerations when necessary. In chapter 4 Millgram argues that 
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our dependence on practical induction is not optional. He claims 
there is no other source for the connecting judgements that will 
unify agency. Finally, in chapter 5, Millgram explains why we 
have no alternative to practical induction, shifting perspective, 
developing an account of agency from the outside in. So he works 
from the point of view of one designing an agent capable of coping 
with the sorts of situations in which human beings find themselves. 
Altogether, Millgram offers his readers a tightly argued and well-
written monograph in defense of an alternative to instrumentalism. 
Practical Induction is a delight to read. Millgram draws freely on 
sources in other disciplines, including fiction. His examples are 
often entertaining and serve to make his case clearer and more 
compelling. This book should be read by anyone doing work on 
practical reason. Philosophers doing work in the philosophy of 
mind, the philosophy of action, and moral psychology, as well as 
those doing work in decision theory and epistemology will benefit 
from reading this book. Millgram breaks new ground in his book 
and deserves the attention of a wide audience. 
Notes 
1 Originally published in the Review of Metaphysics 79 (1976): pp. 
431-463. Reprinted in Alfred R. Meie, ed., The Philosophy of Action 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 149-177. I will refer to the 
latter. 
2 Ibid., pp. 169-170. 
3 It is worth noting that in later writings, specifically, in Change in 
View (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986), Harman concedes that, "the 
revision of belief is sometimes 'part of practical reasoning" (p. 113). 
But the view he adopts is different in important ways from practical 
induction. He does take theoretical and practical reasoning to be 
intertwined (p. 113). The objection to Millgram in the text of this book 
review could be taken to be forwarding just such a notion. 
4 See Harman, "Practical Reasoning," p. 149. 
